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the U-2, and the SR-71 Blackbird. The AMC
brochure gives practical information on how casting professionals
can network with industry colleagues to participate in solving
design problems and obtain government contracts. The point
of intersection of the two is the question of how to make
money in the feast-or-famine world of military procurement
and the aerospace industry.
American Metalcasting
Consortium -- For those who aren't familiar with AMC,
it unites the Defense Logistics Agency, most of the major
U.S. casting industry associations, and university researchers
throughout the country to "harness the benefits of metalcasting
design systems" in order to deliver better procurement options
to the U.S. military -- in terms of cost, speed of delivery,
performance, and reliability. The functional units of the
AMC are cross-disciplinary, hands-on project teams.
Here's an example of a typical AMC project:
figure out how to use a casting to deliver parts cost-effectively
for a gyroscope housing for a "joint stand-off weapon." (In
the example cited, the solution turns out to be a diecasting,
which replaces a part machined from aluminum block, reducing
the cost 67%.)
(More information about AMC, visit http://amc.aticorp.org.)
Glamour -- The
book about Lockheed, Skunk Works, is a bit more of
page-turner than the AMC brochure. Let's face it: the Lockheed
book has the benefit of colorful characters like uber-engineer
and project manager Kelly Johnson ("Goddam it, Rich, I don't
care what in hell that books says or what you happen to think.
Liquid hydrogen is the same as steam. Now, get out there and
do the job for me."), high drama, such as the U-2 incident
(in which pilot Francis Gary Powers was shot down over the
Soviet Union in 1960), and the glamour of racing to design
products like the SR-71 Blackbird ("We'll fly at ninety thousand
feet, and jack up the speed to Mach 3. It will have a range
of four thousand miles."). What is interesting, however, is
the amount of overlap between the breathless adventure tales
in Skunk Works and the just-the-facts-ma'am reporting
by AMC.
Peaks and Valleys
-- When you get past the glamour, you realize that aerospace
-- even military aerospace -- obeys supply and demand, just
like every other industry. And also that it seems that when
you're not struggling with the costly inefficiencies of making
a single prototype, you're up against a shortage of the inputs
you need to deliver a large order on time. As described in
Skunk Works, "Reagan would initiate the biggest peacetime
military spending in our history. During the early 1980s defense
industry sales increased 60 percent in real terms and the
aerospace workforce expanded 15 percent in only three years
--- from 1983 to 1986.
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everything used in
an airplane. Lead times for basic materials stretched from
weeks to literally years . . . We needed specialized machining
and forgings, and our local subcontractors just shrugged us
off . . . ."
Off-the-Shelf Parts
-- Contrary to popular belief, designing a new airplane
does not have to involve reinventing every component. According
to Rich, "Over the years we had developed the concept of using
existing hardware developed and paid for by other programs
to save time and money and reduce the risks of failures in
prototype projects." Thus, the stealth fighter was cobbled
together from "GE J-85 engines . . . . flight control actuators
from the F-111 tactical bomber . . . flight control computer
from the F-16 fighter . . . inertial navigation system from
the B-52 bomber . . . servomechanisms from the F-15 and F-111
. . . pilot's seat from the F-16 . . . . "
All in all, the Skunk
Works came up with fourteen key
points for working successfully on military contracts.
Betting the Farm on
a Fighter -- In the final analysis, supplying aerospace
technology to the U.S. military was a speculative investment
decision, like any other. The standout example was the stealth
bomber, for which Lockheed had to risk development funds at
a difficult time in the company's history. In order to obtain
development funds of $10 million, Rich had to go before the
board of directors and promise a potential market of $2 to
$3 billion. (He got his money, and eventually delivered $6
billion worth of stealth fighters to the U.S. government.)
This was a pattern established earlier with the U-2, which
eventually became a $300 million product, and the SR-71 Blackbird,
a $23 million plane of which Lockheed eventually sold thirty-one.
Apart from the down-to-earth investment/return
propositions discussed in the book, there are two business
lessons I took away. One has to do with marketing, and the
other has to do with adding value.
How Small is Small?
-- The marketing lesson is about the importance of making
your point powerfully, succinctly, and unforgettably. It relates
to the fact that the stealth fighter achieved incredibly small
profiles on radar, and at one point, the government hired
an expert consultant to come up with an independent assessment
of "just how small is small." Rich described the simple but
ingenious method the expert used in his assessment, and the
marketing epiphany it gave him. "MIT's Lindsay Anderson accepted
my invitation in the late summer of 1976 and arrived at my
doorstep carrying a bag of ball bearings in his briefcase.
The ball bearings ranged in size from a golf ball to an eighth
of an inch in diameter. Professor Anderson requested that
we glue each of these balls onto the nose of the [stealth
prototype] and then zap them with radar. This way he could
determine whether our [prototype] had a lower [radar] cross
section than the ball bearings. If the [prototype] in the
background proved to be brighter than the ball in the foreground,
then the ball would not be measured at all . . . . As it turned
out, we measured all the balls easily." Rich was quick to
put this dramatic technique to work on his sales trips: "Rolling
small ball bearings across the desks of four-star generals
. . . paid off handsomely. 'Here's your airplane on radar,'
I declared to their astonishment."
Where "Stealth"
Really Came From -- The value-adding lesson comes from
the way that the Lockheed (and the U.S.) acquired the stealth
technology. The stealthiness of the stealth fighter was achieved
using theories published by a Russian mathematcian, Pyotr
Ufimtsev, and uncovered and championed by a Lockheed engineer,
Denys Overholser. There were two interesting aspects to this.
The first was the failure of the Soviet Union to make use
of its homegrown technology. "Dr. Ufimtsev came to teach electromagnetic
theory at UCLA in 1990. Until his arrival here he had remained
blissfully unaware of his enormous impact on America's stealth
airplane development, but clearly wasn't surprised by the
news. 'Senior Soviet designers were absolutely uninterested
in my theories,' he wryly observed." Second, the implementation
of the theories required the creation of a surface made up
of many flat facets, instead of the usual smooth contours
of airplanes, and this led to a near-mutiny among the long-time
engineers on the project! They just didn't believe an airplane
was supposed to look like that! Their attitude was
best captured in their terms of surrender: "Okay, Ben . .
. . If that flat plate concept is really as revolutionary
as that kid claims in terms of radar cross section, I don't
care what in hell it looks like, I'll get that ugly son-of-a-bitch
to fly." The value-add performed by Lockheed, then, was not
inventing the mathematical theories per se, but in
creating the environment in which their value could be recognized,
discussed, and implemented over the intense doubts of established
designers, and made practical using available tools such as
computer processing.
It seems to me that this is exactly the kind
of powerful communication and value-adding-through-teamwork
the AMC is trying to foster. My advice to casting professionals
who want to take a shot at supplying the U.S. military: first,
read Skunk Works for inspiration, then call AMC for
practical application.
NEXT WEEK: -- We take a look at the commercial aerospace
market with a review of 21st Century Jet,
about the development of the Boeing 777.
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